Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting

Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg and Jörgen Weibull

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: This paper analyzes the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in a public finance context. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population fraction adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual.

Keywords: WELFARE ECONOMICS; VOTING; SOCIAL NORMS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting (1997)
Working Paper: Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:608

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