Sparation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics

Torsten Persson (), Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: A political constitution is like an incomplete contract : it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem : the appointed policy maker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests of the citizens. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials. But elections are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps the voters, in two distincts ways.

Keywords: VOTING; LEGISLATIVE POWER; GOVERNMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Separation of powers and accountability: Towards a formal approach to comparative politics (1997)
Working Paper: Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics (1996)
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