Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics

Torsten Persson (), Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini

No 1475, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the appointed policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests of the citizens. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials. But elections are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps the voters, in two distinct ways. First, it can elicit information held by the appointed officials and not otherwise available to the voters. Second, by playing one body against the other and by aligning the interest of the weaker body with their own, the voters can induce the two bodies to discipline each other. Separation of power only works to the voters' advantage if it is appropriately designed, however, and it can be detrimental if it creates a ''common pool'' problem. These advantages of separation of powers are present both in Presidential and in Parliamentary democracies. Government appointment rules in Parliamentary democracies must be appropriately designed, however, to prevent collusion.

Keywords: Incomplete Contracts; Information Revelation; Legislative Organization; Separation of Powers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Separation of powers and accountability: Towards a formal approach to comparative politics (1997)
Working Paper: Sparation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics (1996)
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