Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining

Elhanan Helpman and Torsten Persson ()

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: Economic policymaking in modern democracies generates a great deal of special-interest politics. In policy areas such as finance, trade policy, and regulation, policy decision create benefits for well-defined groups with the cost borne by society at large. Given the difficulties with the aggregation of preferences, social chioces are often ill defined. Such difficulties can be resolved, however, by suitable institutional arrangements. As a result, many reserachers have examined the institutional details of the policy process in order to predict likely policy outcomes.

Keywords: BARGAINING; POLITICS; SOCIAL CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining (2001)
Working Paper: Lobbying and Legistlative Bargaining (1998)
Working Paper: Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining (1998)
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