Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining

Elhanan Helpman and Torsten Persson ()

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2001, vol. 1, issue 1, 33

Abstract: We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between policies that would result from pure lobbying or from pure legislative bargaining. Second, we show that in congressional systems the resulting policies are strongly skewed in favor of the agenda-setter. In parliamentary systems they are skewed in favor of the coalition, but within the coalition there are many possible outcomes (there are multiple equilibria) with the agenda-setter having no particular advantage. Third, we show that equilibrium contributions are very small, despite the fact that lobbying has a marked effect on policies.

Date: 2001
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Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying and Legistlative Bargaining (1998)
Working Paper: Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining (1998)
Working Paper: Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining (1998)
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DOI: 10.2202/1538-0637.1008

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