Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

Itzhak Gilboa, Dov Samet and David Schmeidler

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society`s utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.

Keywords: EFFICIENCY; UTILITY FUNCTIONS; PROBABILITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes (2004)
Working Paper: Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes (2004)
Working Paper: Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-17

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