Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

Itzhak Gilboa, Dov Samet and David Schmeidler

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Abstract: Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.

Keywords: Utilitarianism; Pareto (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (102)

Published in Journal of Political Economy, 2004, vol. 112, pp.932-938. ⟨10.1086/421173⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes (2004)
Working Paper: Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes (2001)
Working Paper: Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481249

DOI: 10.1086/421173

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