Testing Threats in Repeated Games

Ran Spiegler ()

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: I introduce a solution concept for infinite-horizon games, called ``Experimental Equilibrium``, in which players systematically test threats that affect their optimal response. Both the tests and the optimal response are part of equilibrium behavior.

Keywords: GAMES; EXPERIMENTS; BEHAVIOUR; TESTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Testing threats in repeated games (2005)
Working Paper: Testing Threats in Repeated Games (2002)
Working Paper: Testing Threats in Repeated Games (2002)
Working Paper: Testing Threats in Repeated Games (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-28

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