Ideal Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Multicriteria Games

Mark Voorneveld, S. Grahn and Martin Dufwenberg

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are robust against unilateral deviations of the players no matter what improtance is assigned to the criteria.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1999
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Journal Article: Ideal equilibria in noncooperative multicriteria games (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:1999:19

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