A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value

Mark Voorneveld and S. Grahn

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2001
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Working Paper: A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value (2001)
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