A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value

Mark Voorneveld and Sofia Grahn
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Sofia Grahn: Department of Economics, Postal: Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden

No 2001:2, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

Keywords: Convex game; unanimity game; Shapley value; axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2001-02-01
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Working Paper: A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value (2001)
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