Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information

Rudolf Kerschbamer and N. Maderner

Working Papers from Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy

Abstract: This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontier emissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter's concern for the environment.

Keywords: POLLUTION; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 D82 F42 H23 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:waslbp:9805

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().