Would Big Tobacco Have Been Better?: the Social Welfare Implications of Antitrust Action in the Presence of Negative Externalities

E. Gulbrandsen and Susan Skeath ()

Working Papers from Wellesley College - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers the role of antitrust action in markets with negative externalities and the social welfare consequences of the 1911 break-up of American Tobacco. A theoretical model shows that monopoly can be the preferred market structure in some cases. We provide rough estimates of the magnitude of the excise tax necessary to offset external costs in the cigarette industry and compare the estimates to current tax levels.

Keywords: SOCIAL WELFARE; TOBACCO; TAXATION; ANTITRUST LEGISLATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H23 L4 L66 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:wecoec:99-07

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