The Economic Consequences of a Declining Hegemon

K Hamada

Working Papers from Yale - Economic Growth Center

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to review the concepts of "international public goods" and "hegemony" from the stand point of an economist. It focuses on the incentive structure that a large country or hegemon as well as other countries face in order to make a collective decision. It is misleading, I will argue, to treat many different situations in a single framework of "public goods" or "hegemony". The benefit-cost structure for nations in the trade liberalization process or trade conflicts is different from that in the international monetary cooperation or in the choice of the international monetary regime.

Keywords: PUBLIC GOODS; SOCIAL CHOICE; INTERNATIONAL TRADE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D79 F13 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:yalegr:756

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Yale - Economic Growth Center U.S.A.; YALE UNIVERSITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER, YALE STATION NEW-HAVEN CONNECTICUT 06520 U.S.A. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().