Visitations and Transfers in Non Intact Households

Daniela Del Boca and R. Ribero

Working Papers from Yale - Economic Growth Center

Abstract: Recent research reveals a negative impact of divorce on children's welfare as a consequence of the reduction in monetary and time contributions by the non-custodian parent. When the custody arrangement is sole custody, the variables that link the absent parent to the child are visitations and child support transfers. We explain visitations and child support transfers using a behavioral model of competitive equilibrium in which both variables are the results of competitive allocations realized in a decentralized non-cooperative manner.

Keywords: DIVORCE; FAMILY; CHILDREN (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J10 J12 J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Visitations and Transfers in Non Intact Households (1999)
Working Paper: Visitations and Transfers in Non Intact Households (1999)
Working Paper: VISITATIONS AND TRANSFERS IN NON-INTACT HOUSEHOLS (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:yalegr:807

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