Skills, Partnerships and Tenancy in Sri Lankan Rice Farms

Sanjaya Desilva ()

Working Papers from Yale - Economic Growth Center

Abstract: This paper examines whether sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants in the rice farms of South Asia are distinguished by their farming skills. The idea that fixed-rent contracts are typically given to relatively skilled tenants dates back to the agricultural (tenancy) ladder hypothesis of Spillman [1919]. The screening models [e.g. Hallagan 1978] that have attempted to formalize this idea assume that landlords do not observe the tenants' skill levels. The second part of the paper empirically explores this result with household-level data from Sri Lanka. A two-stage model that distinguishes the choice of contract from the extent of land leased is used. The results clearly show that relatively skilled farmers are more likely to become fixed-rent tenants.

Keywords: AGRICULTURE; LABOUR; HOUSEHOLD (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 O13 O17 Q12 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:yalegr:819

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