Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited

Stephen Morris

Working Papers from Yale - Economic Growth Center

Abstract: Suppose, we replace "knowledge" by "belief with probability p" in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those diffrences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.

Keywords: INFORMATION; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Approximate common knowledge revisited (1999)
Working Paper: Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited
Working Paper: Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited'
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:yalegr:987r

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Yale - Economic Growth Center U.S.A.; YALE UNIVERSITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER, YALE STATION NEW-HAVEN CONNECTICUT 06520 U.S.A. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().