 IMMIGRATION: CHOOSING AN ADAPTATION STRATEGYKonstantin Yanovskiy and Sergey Shulgin Working Papers from Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy Abstract: Modern approaches to immigration policies in most developed countries make the problems of adaptation for new arrivals more severe. Protracted failure to adapt among immigrants (and even of their descendants) turns into recurrent problems vis-a-vis the law, and even extends into large scale incidents. With time, immigrant failure to adapt intensifies, while its localization in space extends to increasingly larger areas. Motivation for maintaining non-selective and non-working immigration are available in plenty for many bureaucrats and “leftist politicians”[1]. In conditions of immigration of this kind, many of the immigrants become recipients of state aid, turning into a manipulated electorate. In essence, we are here talking about importing manipulated electorates from countries which lack democratic traditions. The cases of Canada and Australia demonstrates that the mechanism of selective immigration allows for an optimal combination of satisfying labor market needs with moderate costs of adaptation for the new citizens. This means that the costs are moderate for all: for the new immigrants, for their neighbors, and for society as a whole. Keywords: : Government's immigration strategy; immigrants' adaptation incentives; civic skill and human capital; private property devaluation; immigrants electoral behavior. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gai:wpaper:0110 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy Contact information at EDIRC. |
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