Are Fast Court Proceedings Good or Bad ?: Evidence from Japanese Household Panel Data

Charles Horioka () and Shizuka Sekita ()
Additional contact information
Shizuka Sekita: Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya City University, Yamanohata 1, Mizuho, Mizuho, Nagoya, Aichi 467-8501, JAPAN

No 916, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We analyze the effect of the degree of judicial enforcement on the probability of credit constraints, the amount of loan and the probability of default. Contrary to the traditional view on judicial efficiency of credit market, our estimation results show that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of being rationed and decreases credit granted by banks, consistent with laziness effects. In order to confirm the laziness effect more directly, we analyzed the effect of the degree of judicial enforcement on the probability of default and found that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of default, as expected.

Keywords: segregation; Schelling; potential function; coordination; tax; vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 C73 D62 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2009/0916.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Are Fast Court Proceedings Good or Bad?: Evidence from Japanese Household Panel Data (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0916

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nelly Wirth ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).