Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision

Ahmet Ozkardas () and Agnieszka Rusinowska
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Ahmet Ozkardas: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France; CNRS, GATE, UMR 5824, Ecully, F-69130, France

No 930, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to determine these equilibria.

Keywords: union - firm bargaining; alternating offers; varying discount rates; subgame perfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0930

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