Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision

Ahmet Ozkardas () and Agnieszka Rusinowska
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Ahmet Ozkardas: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to determine these equilibria.

Keywords: alternating offers; varying discount rates; subgame perfection; union; firm bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00464387v1
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Published in 2009

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Working Paper: Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00464387

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