Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation
Mateus Joffily (),
David Masclet (),
Charles Noussair and
Marie Claire Villeval
Additional contact information
Mateus Joffily: IPUB, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Av. Venceslau Brás, 71, 22290-140, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; CNRS, Centre des Neurosciences Cognitives, Bron, France
No 1113, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon
Abstract:
We use skin conductance responses and self-reports of hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. Emotional reaction to free-riding incites individuals to apply sanctions when they are available. The application of sanctions activates a "virtuous emotional circle" that accompanies cooperation. Emotionally aroused cooperators relieve negative emotions when they punish free riders. In response, the free-riders experience negative emotions when punished, and increase their subsequent level of cooperation. The outcome is an increased level of contribution that becomes the new standard or norm. For a given contribution level, individuals attain higher levels of satisfaction when sanctioning institutions are in place.
Keywords: Emotions; Sanctions; Cooperation; Experiment; Skin Conductance Responses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D62 D63 D64 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2011/1113.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Emotions, Sanctions, and Cooperation (2014) 
Working Paper: Emotions, sanctions and cooperation (2014) 
Working Paper: Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation (2011) 
Working Paper: Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation (2011) 
Working Paper: Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation (2011) 
Working Paper: Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation (2009)
Working Paper: Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1113
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