Endogenous firms’ organization, internal audit and leniency programs

Emilie Dargaud () and Armel Jacques
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Emilie Dargaud: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France

No 1524, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are effcient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.

Keywords: Collusion; antitrust policy; leniency programs; multimarket contact; organizational form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L22 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2017)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2017)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2016)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2016)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2015)
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