Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs

Emilie Dargaud () and Armel Jacques
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Emilie Dargaud: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are effcient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.

Keywords: Collusion; antitrust policy; leniency programs; multimarket contact; organizational form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08-26
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Published in European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, EARIE, Aug 2016, Lisbonne, Portugal

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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2017)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2017)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2016)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms’ organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2015)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2015)
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