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Can transparency of information reduce embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Salvatore Di Falco (), Brice Magdalou (), David Masclet (), Marie Claire Villeval () and Marc Willinger ()
Additional contact information
Salvatore Di Falco: University of Geneva, Bd du Pont-d'Arve 40, CH-1211 Genève 4, Suisse

No 1618, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: Embezzlement is a major concern. By means of a sequential dictator game, we investigate theoretically and experimentally whether making information more transparent and reducing the number of intermediaries in transfer chains can reduce embezzlement. Consistent with reference-dependent preferences in terms of moral ideal, we show that the impact of transparency is conditional on the length of the transfer chain and on the position of the intermediary in the chain. Its direct effect on image encourages honesty. Its indirect effect via expectations plays in the opposite direction, motivating intermediaries to embezzle more when expecting that the following intermediary will embezzle less.

Keywords: Embezzlement; corruption; dishonesty; transparency; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed

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Working Paper: Can transparency of information reduce embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Can Transparency of Information Reduce Embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Can transparency of information reduce embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania (2016) Downloads
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