EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees

Mostapha Diss () and Muhammad Mahajne ()
Additional contact information
Muhammad Mahajne: Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France

No 1906, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable. We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every non-member by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.

Keywords: Voting; Multiwinner Elections; Committee; Condorcet; Social Acceptability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2019/1906.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1906

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nelly Wirth ().

 
Page updated 2020-02-22
Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1906