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Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees

Mostapha Diss () and Muhammad Mahajne
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Muhammad Mahajne: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable. We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every non-member by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.

Keywords: Social Acceptability; Voting; Multiwinner Elections; Committee; Condorcet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
Date: 2019-02-08
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02011732
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Working Paper: Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees (2019) Downloads
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