Does trust mean giving and not risking? Experimental evidence from the trust game
L. Muller and
Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)
In a within-subjects framework, we compare levels of transfer in the trust game and in the (triple) dictator game. We control preferences towards risk through the Holt and Laury test (2002) and social preferences with the ring test (Liebrand, 1984). We then provide evidence that social preferences correlate with levels of transfer, while risk attitudes do not. Finally, we also cast doubts on the predictive power of the two tests.
Keywords: DICTATOR GAME; TRUST GAME; RISK ATTITUDE; SOCIAL PREFERENCE; EXPERIMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Does Trust Mean Giving and not Risking? Experimental Evidence from the Trust Game (2015)
Working Paper: Does Trust Mean Giving and not Risking? Experimental Evidence from the Trust Game (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2013-12
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