Visa Quotas, Undocumented Migration, and Skill Selection
Giorgio Fabbri
Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)
Abstract:
We study how expanding official migration channels affects the size and composition of inflows when individuals with heterogeneous income choose between staying, applying for a rationed legal visa, or attempting undocumented migration. We characterize the equilibrium sorting, showing that official channels attract intermediate-income agents while the undocumented route attracts those with lower incomes. Increasing visa quotas replaces a mass of undocumented migrants with official applicants: while this shift reduces irregularity and alters the skill composition of arrivals, we find that it can paradoxically reduce the total number of migrants. This “crowding-in reversal” occurs when the policy triggers an excessive displacement from the always-accessible undocumented path to the rationed official lottery.
Keywords: Visa Quotas; Undocumented Migration; Equilibrium Sorting; Skill Selection; Migration Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 F22 J24 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2026-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2026-07
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