Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems

Roger Lagunoff

Working Papers from Georgetown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper models status quo (SQ) protection of property rights. A politico-legal system determines eligibility of citizen-groups for protection. A ruling authority can reallocate property iff reallocation is preferable to the status quo for one such group. Along the solution path, SQ protections distort allocations across different assets and across different property owners. Asset distortions vanish in the limit as the path converges to a stationary assignment. Ownership distortions vanish in the limit if there are no individuals who belong to every eligible group. If the authority is self-interested, then systemic protection of vulnerable groups may be welfare improving.

Keywords: Dynamic Status Quo Protections; Politico-legal system; Veto Set; Systemic protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 H13 H41 P5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2022-05-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~22-22-06

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Roger Lagunoff Professor of Economics Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036
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