Matching with Quotas
Mikhail Freer () and
Mariia Titova ()
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Mariia Titova: Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego
No 1051, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science
The paper characterizes the core of many-to-one matching problem with quotas. The many-to-one matching problem with quotas may have an empty core, and there is no clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee non-emptiness of the core. Usual sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core for matching problems cannot be applied for the problem with quotas. We introduce set strong substitutability of preferences, a refinement of strong substitutability for the problem with quotas. We show that if preferences are set strongly substitutable, then the core of many-to-one matching problem with quotas is non-empty. Moreover, we prove that in this case the core has a lattice structure with opposition of interests. Length: 16
Keywords: Matching; Stability; Fixed Point; Quotas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02, Revised 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gms:wpaper:1051
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