Political Economics of Broadcast Media

Alejandro Castañeda () and Cesar Martinelli
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Alejandro Castañeda: Centro de Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alejandro Castañeda

No 1055, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Abstract: We offer a tractable model of broadcast media as a three-sided platform, serving entertainment and news to viewers, commercial opportunities to advertisers, and electoral influence to politicians. We characterize the profit maximization decision of a media firm, and study the effect on social welfare of changes in the value of electoral influence, via induced changes in commercial advertising, the entertainment value of media, and political distortions.

Pages: 29
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
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