Splitting Nuclear Parks or Not? The Third Party Liability Role

Gerard Mondello

No 2014-05, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: Starting from the standard analysis of accident theory, this paper shows that determining the first-best level of care of ultra-hazardous activities also involves determining the best industrial structure. The analysis assesses the impact of the civil nuclear liability on the organization of given electro-nuclear parks. The object is to know whether these liability rules induce horizontally concentrating the management of nuclear industry or not. In a model extended from two to n plants, we show that the institutional conditions (cap on the operator’s liability and the insurance compensation) play a fundamental role in the inducement to centralize or not this management. Hence, a priori, no organization framework is more efficient than the other one.

Keywords: Strict liability; Electric Energy; nuclear plants; limited liability; concentration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L13 L52 L94 Q5 Q53 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-law
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http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2014-05.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: SPLITTING NUCLEAR PARKS OR NOT? THE THIRD PARTY LIABILITY ROLE (2021)
Journal Article: Splitting nuclear parks or not? The third party liability role (2015)
Working Paper: Splitting nuclear parks or not? The third party liability role (2015)
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