Splitting nuclear parks or not? The third party liability role

Gerard Mondello

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Abstract: This paper studies how the combination of strict liability regime, a stringent control from regulatory agencies and insurance companies could help in defining the highest prevention level concerning ultra-hazardous industries. It presents a model extended from two to n nuclear power stations and shows that the institutional conditions (cap on operator's liability and insurance compensation) play a fundamental role in inducing whether or not to centralize the management of a nuclear park. It reaches conclusive results in defining the critical ratios that induce either a centralized or a decentralized management.

Keywords: limited liability; concentration; Strict liability; Electric Energy; nuclear plants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Published in Energy Economics, 2015, ⟨10.1016/j.eneco.2015.08.016⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: SPLITTING NUCLEAR PARKS OR NOT? THE THIRD PARTY LIABILITY ROLE (2021)
Journal Article: Splitting nuclear parks or not? The third party liability role (2015)
Working Paper: Splitting Nuclear Parks or Not? The Third Party Liability Role (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01251422

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.08.016

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