Equilibrium properties of finite binary choice games

Adriaan Soetevent

No 200314, CCSO Working Papers from University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: In this paper I derive a complete characterization for the equilibria that may arise in a binary choice interaction model with a ?nite number of interacting agents. In particular, the correspondence between the interaction strength, the number of agents and the set of equilibria is derived.

Date: 2003
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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium Properties of Finite Binary Choice Games (2004)
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