Equilibrium Properties of Finite Binary Choice Games

Adriaan Soetevent

No 157, Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: This paper derives a complete characterization for the equilibrium properties of a binary choice interaction model with a finite number of agents - in particular the correspondence between the interaction strength, the number of agents, and the set of equilibria. For the class of games considered, the results may prove to be useful in developing efficient algorithms for finding all equilibria

Keywords: discrete choice; social interactions; multiple equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Working Paper: Equilibrium properties of finite binary choice games (2003)
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