Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives

Jan-Henrik Steg (), Elshan Garashli (), Michael Greinecker () and Christoph Kuzmics
Additional contact information
Jan-Henrik Steg: Bielefeld University, Germany
Elshan Garashli: University of Graz, Austria
Michael Greinecker: ENS Paris-Saclay, France

No 2024-09, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Communication; Information transmission; Robustness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://unipub.uni-graz.at/obvugrveroeff/download/ ... riginalFilename=true

Related works:
Working Paper: Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grz:wpaper:2024-09

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://repecgrz.uni-graz.at/RePEc/

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics University of Graz, Universitaetsstr. 15/F4, 8010 Graz, Austria. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefan Borsky ().