Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives

Jan-Henrik Steg, Elshan Garashli, Michael Greinecker and Christoph Kuzmics

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Abstract: For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium.

Date: 2023-09, Revised 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives (2024)
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