No Shame in my Name: Public Disclosure and Tax Compliance in a low-capacity state

Priya Manwaring () and Tanner Regan ()

No 2025-010, Working Papers from The George Washington University, The Center for Economic Research

Abstract: Public disclosure of tax behavior is potentially promising for raising compliance in low-capacity states. This paper provides evidence on the social determinants of tax compliance through two cross-randomized experiments in Kampala, Uganda. We estimate effects of reporting delinquents and recognizing compliers. Compliance increases 17% for those subject to reporting but falls 16% for those promised recognition. Results support a model where being publicly known as tax-liable is costly but social sanctions for delinquency are limited. Further, disseminating tax behavior causes recipients to update compliance beliefs downward and reduces actual compliance by 20%. Overall, simple enforcement reminders raise more revenue.

Keywords: property tax; tax morale; public disclosure; social image; Africa. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H26 H30 O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 81 pages
Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwc:wpaper:2025-010

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