Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in U.S. Antidumping Investigations?: An Emperical Analysis

Michael Moore and Alan Fox ()

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US chose faced facts available margins for the 1995-2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who do not. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firms decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.

Keywords: antidumping; commercial policy; trade policy; facts available (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2008-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2008-17

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