Public Disclosure and Tax Compliance: Evidence from Uganda

Tanner Regan and Priya Manwaring
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Priya Manwaring: University of Oxford

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Public disclosure of tax behavior is a promising policy tool for raising tax compliance in low-income countries with limited capacity for alternative enforcement mechanisms. Through a field experiment involving over 65,000 taxpayers in Kampala, we study effects of reporting delinquents and recognizing compliers and provide evidence on the social determinants of tax compliance. The threat of publicly disclosing delinquency raises compliance, but subsequently disseminating delinquent behavior lowers compliance of others. Public recognition backfires, lowering compliance both for those promised recognition and for those who receive information about compliant taxpayers. These results are consistent with a model of tax evasion with privacy costs to tax eligibility status and limited shame of delinquency. Disseminating tax behavior reduces compliance by lowering compliance beliefs as measured in survey data. Overall, public disclosure policies in this context are limited at raising revenue and enforcement reminder nudges more effective.

Keywords: property tax; tax morale; public disclosure; shaming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 H30 O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 78 pages
Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Public disclosure and tax compliance: evidence from Uganda (2023)
Working Paper: Public Disclosure and Tax Compliance: Evidence from Uganda (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2023-04

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