Public disclosure and tax compliance: evidence from Uganda

Priya Manwaring and Tanner Regan

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: Public disclosure policies have potential to raise tax compliance where alternative enforcement capacity is limited. We study the effects of reporting delinquents and recognizing compliers and provide evidence on the social determinants of tax compliance. Our results are consistent with a model in which being publicly known as tax-eligible is costly but social sanctions for delinquency are limited. Further, disseminating information on tax behavior reduces the compliance of recipients by causing their beliefs to be updated down toward the true compliance rate. Overall, these policies are limited at raising revenue and less effective than simple enforcement reminder nudges.

Keywords: property tax; tax morale; public disclosure; shaming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue and nep-nud
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Public Disclosure and Tax Compliance: Evidence from Uganda (2023)
Working Paper: Public Disclosure and Tax Compliance: Evidence from Uganda (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1937

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