Taming Private Leviathans: Regulation versus Taxation

Grégoire Rota-Graziosi (), Asif Islam and Rabah Arezki
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Grégoire Rota-Graziosi: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne

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Abstract: This paper explores the interplay between top wealth and policies namely regulation and taxation exploiting variation in exposure to international commodity prices. Using a global panel dataset of billionaire's net worth, results point to a positive relationship between commodity prices and the concentration of wealth at the top. Regulation especially pertaining to competition is found to limit the effects of commodity price shocks on top wealth concentration while taxation has little effect. Moreover, commodity price shocks crowd out non-resource tax revenue hence limiting the scope for income transfers and redistribution. Results are consistent with the primacy of ex ante interventions over ex post ones to address top wealth inequality.

Keywords: Inequality; Wealth concentration; Competition; Tax; Natural resources; Development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://uca.hal.science/hal-03129746v1
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Working Paper: Taming Private Leviathans: Regulation versus Taxation (2021)
Working Paper: Taming Private Leviathans: Regulation versus Taxation (2021)
Working Paper: Taming Private Leviathans: Regulation versus Taxation (2021)
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