Taming Private Leviathans: Regulation versus Taxation
Rabah Arezki (),
Asif Islam and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI ()
No 226, OxCarre Working Papers from Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford
This paper explores the interplay between top wealth and policies namely regulation and taxation exploiting variation in exposure to international commodity prices. Using a global panel dataset of billionaire’s net worth, results point to a positive relationship between commodity prices and the concentration of wealth at the top. Regulation especially pertaining to competition is found to limit the effects of commodity price shocks on top wealth concentration while taxation has little effect. Moreover, commodity price shocks crowd out non-resource tax revenue hence limiting the scope for income transfers and redistribution. Results are consistent with the primacy of ex ante interventions over ex post ones to address top wealth inequality.
Keywords: inequality; wealth concentration, competition, tax, natural resources, development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D63 H26 H20 O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:oxcrwp:226
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