Concentration Horizontale et Relations Verticales

Marie-Laure Allain and Saïd Souam ()

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Abstract: This paper studies horizontal mergers in vertically related markets. In a two-level Cournot model, with an intermediate and a final market, we show that downstream mergers inducing size effects are, ceteris paribus, more profitable than upstream ones. Moreover, a merger at one level reduces the incentives to merge at the other level. Endogenizing the firms' decisions to merge by considering a merger game supports the previous results.

Keywords: Horizontal mergers; vertical relationships; merger control.; contrôle des concentrations; fusions horizontales; relations verticales; contrôle des concentrations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-27
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00143920
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Related works:
Working Paper: Concentration Horizontale et Relations Verticales (2007)
Working Paper: Concentration horizontale et relations verticales (2006)
Working Paper: Concentration horizontale et relations verticales (2005)
Working Paper: Concentration horizontale et relations verticales (2004)
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