Concentration horizontale et relations verticales

Marie-Laure Allain and Saïd Souam ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of horizontal mergers in vertically related industries. In a successive oligopoly model with an intermediate market, we show that horizontal mergers creating size effects are relatively more profitable downstream than upstream. Furthermore, concentration in an industry reduces the incentives to merge in the vertically related industries. These results hold in a merger game endogenising the merger process.

Keywords: Mergers; Vertical relationships; Competition policy; Relations verticales; Concentrations; Politique de la concurrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242914v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00242914v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Concentration Horizontale et Relations Verticales (2007)
Working Paper: Concentration Horizontale et Relations Verticales (2007)
Working Paper: Concentration horizontale et relations verticales (2006)
Working Paper: Concentration horizontale et relations verticales (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242914

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().