The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and Jean-Pierre Vidal
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Jean-Pierre Vidal: European Council - European Council

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and this coalition is stable.

Keywords: Tax competition; Leadership; Strategic interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2014, 34 (1), pp.51-62

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Journal Article: The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal (2014)
Working Paper: The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01044913

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