The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and Jean-pierre Vidal ()
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Jean-pierre Vidal: European Council

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 1, 51-62

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and this coalition is stable.

Keywords: Tax competition; Leadership; Strategic interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01-14
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Related works:
Working Paper: The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal (2014)
Working Paper: The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00631

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