Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core

Ulrich Faigle (), Michel Grabisch, Andres Jiménez-Losada () and Manuel Ordóñez ()
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Andres Jiménez-Losada: Escuela Superior de Ingenieros
Manuel Ordóñez: Escuela Superior de Ingenieros

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We introduce cooperative TU-games on concept lattices, where a concept is a pair (S,S' ) with S being a subset of players or objects, and S' a subset of attributes. Any such game induces a game on the set of players/objects, which appears to be a TU-game whose collection of feasible coalitions is a lattice closed under intersection, and a game on the set of attributes. We propose a Shapley value for each type of game, axiomatize it, and investigate the geometrical properties of the core (nonemptiness, boundedness, pointedness, extremal rays).

Keywords: Shapley value; core; cooperative game; restricted cooperation; concept lattice; jeu coopératif; valeur de Shapley; coopération restreinte; coeur; treillis de concept (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Published in 2014

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Related works:
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2016)
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2016)
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2016)
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2014)
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01111670

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