Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core

Ulrich Faigle (), Michel Grabisch, Andres Jiménez-Losada () and Manuel Ordóñez ()
Additional contact information
Andres Jiménez-Losada: University of Seville - Escuela Superior de Ingenieros
Manuel Ordóñez: University of Seville - Escuela Superior de Ingenieros
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Manuel Ordóñez Sánchez ()

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We introduce cooperative TU-games on concept lattices, where a concept is a pair (S,S') with S being a subset of players or objects, and S' a subset of attributes. Any such game induces a game on the set of players/objects, which appears to be a TU-game whose collection of feasible coalitions is a lattice closed under intersection, and a game on the set of attributes. We propose a Shapley value for each type of game, axiomatize it, and investigate the geometrical properties of the core (nonemptiness, boundedness, pointedness, extremal rays)

Keywords: Cooperation game; restricted cooperation; concept lattice; core; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2014/14070.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2016)
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2016)
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2016)
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2014)
Working Paper: Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14070

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